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Tabor Lecture
STONEWALLING, LEAKS, AND COUNTERLEAKS: SCOTUS ETHICS IN THE WAKE OF
NFIB V. SEBELIUS
Steven Lubet∗
Clare Diegel∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court litigation over the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) came to a conclusion in the first half of
2012, characterized by a series of surprises. The first surprise occurred
when the Court scheduled the case for six hours of oral argument,
spread over three days.
Such an expanded argument was
unprecedented in modern times, leading to much speculation that the
issues would be more troublesome for the Court than many observers
had previously assumed. Still, even veteran court watchers were further
shocked by the combative tone of the oral argument itself, when Justices
Scalia, Alito, Kennedy, and Roberts seemed to gang up on Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli, who defended the PPACA on behalf of the
government. CNN legal correspondent Jeffrey Toobin called the oral
argument a “train wreck” for the Obama administration, and he
consequently changed his thinking about the outcome of the case, now
predicting that the Act’s individual mandate—the central and most
controversial provision of the law—was unlikely to be upheld.1 Toobin’s
conclusion was shared by many commentators in the ten weeks between
the oral argument and the decision in the case. The political futures
market “Intrade” rated the probability of invalidating the Act’s
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1
Noah Rothman, CNN’s Jeffrey Toobin on Health Care Ruling: This Is a Day ‘For Me to Eat
a Bit of Crow’, MEDIAITE (June 28, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/cnnsjeffrey-toobin-this-is-a-day-for-me-to-eat-a-bit-of-crow/; see also Toobin: Mandate in Grave
Trouble (CNN television broadcast Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://www.cnn.com/video/
#/video/crime/2012/03/27/nr-toobin-mandate.cnn (providing the video clip of the
original television broadcast where Jeffrey Toobin opined that he thought the individual
mandate was going to be struck down).
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individual mandate at seventy percent.2 This, of course, set the stage for
the most significant surprise of all. On June 28, 2012, Chief Justice John
Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by the four most
liberal Justices, in which he upheld the individual mandate as a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under the Taxation Clause of the
Constitution.3
The surprises did not end with the resolution of the case. There were
three written opinions—Roberts’s opinion for the Court, Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence, and an unsigned joint dissent by Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas—and rumors began to fly as soon as
they were distributed to the press. Based on the structure and language
of the joint dissent, it was soon suggested that Chief Justice Roberts had
initially intended to join his four conservative colleagues in striking
down the mandate, but that he had changed his mind at the last minute. 4
To that reading—which was based on some fairly solid textual clues—
various blogs and websites quickly added the innuendo that Roberts had
succumbed to outside pressure from President Obama and certain liberal
journalists who, it was said, had threatened somehow to “delegitimize”
the Supreme Court if key provisions of the PPACA were invalidated.5
See The U.S. Supreme Court to Rule Individual Mandate Unconstitutional Before Midnight
ET 31 Dec. 2012, INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com/v4/markets/contract/?contractId=
745353 (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (providing a chart that illustrates the seventy percent
probability); see also “Individual Mandate” Likely Ruled Unconstitutional; Will Bring Down
ACA, SOBER LOOK (June 12, 2012), http://soberlook.com/2012/06/individual-mandatelikely-ruled.html (noting Intrade’s probability that the individual mandate would get
struck down).
3
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB
v. Sebelius] (providing the Supreme Court decision on the individual health care mandate).
4
See Chris Gentilviso, John Roberts Health Care Decision: Supreme Court Chief Justice
Switched Sides, CBS Reports, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2012, 3:32 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/01/john-roberts-health-care-decision-supremecourt-chief-justice_n_1641481.html (pointing out that Scalia’s response to Roberts is at the
end of the dissent, rather than worked into the body).
5
See, e.g., Randy Barnett, More on the Left’s Threat to Delegitimate the Supreme Court if It
Invalidates the ACA, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/22/more-on-the-lefts-threat-to-delegitimate-thesupreme-court-if-it-invalidates-the-aca/; David Bernstein, Was the Dissent Originally a
Majority Opinion?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2012, 11:23 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/28/was-scalias-dissent-originally-a-majority-opinion/
(speculating that Justice Roberts was responding to heat from President Obama and others,
preemptively threatening to delegitimize the Court if it invalidated the mandate); John
Podhoretz, Roberts the Coward, N.Y. POST (July 2, 2012, 10:34 PM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/roberts_the_coward_rLGKy
8EebRuDi8KrIXXAmL (stating that perhaps Justice Roberts changed his vote out of fear of
attacks on the Supreme Court’s legitimacy); Avik Roy, Did Roberts Cave to Left-Wing Media
Pressure?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 1, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/304516/did-roberts-cave-left-wing-media-pressure-avik-roy (hypothesizing that
2
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The biggest revelation, however, came on July 1, 2012, when CBS
legal correspondent Jan Crawford posted an article describing Roberts’s
change of heart and Justice Kennedy’s “relentless” attempts to bring him
back to the conservative side.6 According to Crawford, the unsigned
joint dissent was thereafter crafted to deliberately ignore Roberts’s
majority opinion, as a signal that Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas
“were no longer even willing to engage with him in debate.”7
Crawford’s post (and another a few days later) included many more
otherwise confidential details about the Court’s drafting and decision
process in the PPACA case, indicating that she had obtained multiple
interviews with knowledgeable insiders. A consummate professional,
Crawford did not reveal the names of her “two sources with specific
knowledge of the deliberations,” but she included information—such as
the initial vote during the post-argument conference and the subsequent
“ire” of the four conservatives—that could only have been known by one
or more of the Justices themselves.8 It is possible, of course, that some
of the Justices complained out loud to their clerks, who then spoke to
Crawford, although that is improbable.9 As Professor Orin Kerr
explained on the highly regarded Volokh Conspiracy blog, a clerk’s
breach of confidentiality would amount to career suicide at a young and
promising age, and SCOTUS clerks do not obtain their positions by
being incautious.10 It is therefore much more likely—indeed, almost
Justice Roberts made his decision because of the concern of the Supreme Court’s image if
the mandate was overturned); Ilya Somin, The Impact of the Individual Mandate Decision on
the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 13, 2012, 12:57 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/13/the-impact-of-the-individual-mandate-decision-onthe-supreme-courts-legitimacy (analyzing the impact of the individual mandate decision
on the public’s view of the Supreme Court); W.W., Obamacare and the Supreme Court: John
ECONOMIST
(June
28,
2012,
9:01
PM),
Roberts’s
Art
of
War,
THE
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/06/obamacare-andsupreme-court-0 (stating that Justice Roberts was worried about the “liberal freak-out over
the mere possibility of a ruling striking down Obamacare”).
6
Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 1,
2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switchedviews-to-uphold-health-care law/?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
7
See id. (“Instead, the four joined forces and crafted a highly unusual, unsigned joint
dissent. They deliberately ignored Roberts’ decision, the sources said, as if they were no
longer even willing to engage with him in debate.”).
8
Id.
9
See Nina Totenberg: SCOTUS Secrets, Leaks & Pizza with Scalia, BLOOMBERG LAW (July
11, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KW_IdVMEJRk (providing a video
broadcast of Nina Totenberg explaining her view that the individual mandate decision was
leaked to the public and hypothesizing that the leak came from someone who was angry
about Roberts switch, such as another Justice, a clerk, or even a significant other).
10
Orin Kerr, Who Leaked?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 5:43 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/who-leaked/; see also Zach Carter, Antonin Scalia
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certain—that Crawford’s sources included one or more of the dissenting
Justices. It was the dissenters who were aggrieved by Roberts’s
perceived betrayal—the liberals had no reason to complain—and they
were accordingly most likely to vent their anonymous resentment to
Crawford. The leakers’ identities will someday be revealed, although
perhaps not until the papers of a current Justice are made available to
historians. In the meantime, it is a fair working hypothesis that
Crawford’s source was a member of the Court and not a subordinate.11
We must therefore face an uncomfortable question that scholars have
seldom seriously asked in American judicial history. Assuming that a
Justice breached the confidentiality of the Court, was it unethical?
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S MISSING CODE OF ETHICS
In most situations, there would be an obvious first step in
determining whether a judge’s actions were unethical: just look at the
relevant version of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Every state supreme
court has adopted a version of the Code, as has the Judicial Conference of
Blasts Health Care Reform Decision, Says Supreme Court Is Not ‘Political,’ HUFFINGTON POST
(July 29, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/29/antonin-scaliahealth-care-reform_n_1715886.html (explaining that in an interview Justice Scalia referred
to the leaker as “someone who was breaking the oath of confidentiality”); Piers Morgan
Tonight: Justice Antonin Scalia (CNN television broadcast July 18, 2012), available at
http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/07/antonin-scalia-john-roberts-health-careruling.php (providing a television interview where Justice Scalia denied the accuracy of the
leaked information, implying that he had not been the source). See generally Charles W.
Sorenson, Jr., Are Law Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
22–37 (2008) (explaining the origin of law clerks, the intimate relationship between clerk
and judge, and the vitality of confidentiality to the judge-clerk relationship).
11
The most momentous possible leak in Supreme Court history occurred on March 4,
1857, at the inauguration of James Buchanan, when Chief Justice Roger Taney was seen
whispering to the President-elect shortly before administering the oath of office. A few
minutes later, in his inaugural address, Buchanan stated that the Supreme Court was about
to “speedily and finally” resolve the issue of slavery expansion, and he urged all citizens to
“cheerfully submit” to the Court’s ruling. Two days later, Taney announced the Dred Scott
decision, which held, inter alia, that the Congress could not prohibit slavery in the national
territories. It was soon rumored that Taney had disclosed the ruling to Buchanan, as part of
a pro-slavery cabal. That turns out to have been untrue, but only because it was
unnecessary. Buchanan had been in correspondence with several other Justices during the
previous months, and he did not need a public tip from Taney to know how the case would
be decided. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 312–13 (1978) (providing the details of the Buchanan
inauguration in relationship to the Dred Scott decision); see also Jonathan Peters, The
Supreme Court Leaks: The High Court Has a Long and Storied History of Dishing on Itself, SLATE
(July 6, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2012/07/the_supreme_court_leaking_john_robert_s_decision_to_change_his_mind_on_he
alth_care_should_not_come_as_such_a_surprise_.html (providing a brief history of other
major Supreme Court leaks).
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the United States (which sets policy for the lower federal courts). The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has steadfastly declined to adopt or
announce a code for itself, thus making it the only court in the United
States with no clearly defined ethical standards.12 At the outset of Chief
Justice Roberts’s tenure, there was some hope that he might lead the
Court to promulgate a code, or at least to announce a more definite set of
standards for the Justices, but that has not been the case. Consequently,
the Court has been repeatedly questioned about the conduct of
individual Justices—regarding, for example, the acceptance of gifts,
outside speaking engagements, the accuracy of financial disclosure
forms, recusal, and now confidentiality—with no simple answers
forthcoming.
In reaction to this void in the ethical landscape, 138 law professors
wrote to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on March 17, 2011,
urging the consideration of legislation that would require the Supreme
Court to adhere to the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct. Although
the letter was inevitably politicized, given the nature of the controversies
surrounding the Court, its stated goals were politically neutral: “The
purpose of this letter is to issue a nonpartisan call for the implementation
of mandatory and enforceable rules to protect the integrity of the
Supreme Court.”13 Soon afterward, Congressman Chris Murphy (D-CT)
introduced the Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011
(H.R. 862), which provides that “[t]he Code of Conduct for United States
Judges adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States shall
apply to the justices of the United States Supreme Court to the same
extent as such Code applies to circuit and district judges.”14 Neither
Congress nor the Court took any action regarding the proposed statute,
but Chief Justice Roberts evidently took notice of the public concern. He
devoted the first half of his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary to

See James J. Alfini, Supreme Court Ethics: The Need for Greater Transparency and
Accountability, 21 PROF. LAW., 2012, at 10, 10–14.
13
See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Mar.
17, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (requesting
congressional reform of Supreme Court ethical and recusal standards and noting the
“[r]ecent media reports [that] have focused public attention” on the issue).
Lubet disclosure: I signed the law professors’ letter. In retrospect, I think it might
have been preferable to abstain in order to avoid any appearance that politics had intruded
into judicial ethics, although I continue to think that the letter’s requests were both
compelling and apolitical.
14
Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 2(a)
(2011).
12
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a defense of the Court’s determination not to promulgate its own ethics
code.15
Chief Justice Roberts began his defense by offering to “provide some
clarification on how the Justices address ethical issues and dispel some
common misconceptions.”16 He admitted that the Code is an appropriate
“starting point and a key source of guidance for the Justices.”17 But he
also explained that there is “no reason” to adopt it as the Court’s
“definitive source of ethical guidance” because it is only one of many
texts and other authorities the Court can consult for guidance.18 He
added that the Code “cannot answer all questions,” and “it does not
adequately answer some of the ethical considerations unique to the
Supreme Court.”19 Finally, Roberts noted that “no compilation of ethical
rules can guarantee integrity.”20
All of Roberts’s observations are accurate enough, but they do not
justify, or even explain, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to adopt a
code of conduct. Access to multiple additional sources, for example, is
equally true for every court in the United States. As Roberts put it, they
may all “consult a wide variety of other authorities to resolve specific
ethical issues [including] judicial opinions, treatises, scholarly articles,
and disciplinary decisions.”21 And yet no other court has thought that to
be a sufficient reason to avoid promulgating its own code.
Likewise, the observation that “no compilation of ethical rules can
guarantee integrity” is little more than a platitude.22 It goes without
saying that codes, rules, statutes, and even religious vows can all be
broken. Nonetheless, we still have laws to govern our actions and to
articulate society’s expectations about our behavior. Indeed, codes
ranging from sacred to mundane—from the Ten Commandments and
the Constitution to lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct and municipal
building regulations—are violated every day, but few thoughtful people
(apart from the occasional anarchist) would suggest that they are
therefore meaningless or unnecessary. Chief Justice Roberts’s argument
to the contrary is deeply unsatisfying. According to Roberts, the Justices
have so much integrity that a code is unnecessary, and yet there is no
See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.
pdf.
16
Id. at 3.
17
Id. at 5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 11.
21
Id. at 5.
22
Id. at 11.
15
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guarantee they would adhere to a code if they had one. The Chief would
no doubt reject that sort of circular reasoning from a lawyer, and it is no
more persuasive coming from the Court.
At the Supreme Court level, the function of a judicial code is not to
compel compliance or punish violations—both of which would be
impossible. Rather, the purpose of a code would be to set identifiable
standards for the Justices’ conduct, so that the public may know what to
expect of the nine most powerful judges in the nation. Is it right or
wrong for Justices to speak anonymously to the press following a
controversial decision? Is it acceptable for Justices to appear at political
fundraisers or to address partisan legal organizations? To vacation with
litigants in the middle of pending proceedings? To endorse candidates
for elective office? To solicit charitable contributions? To comment on
legal issues or cases pending in other courts? To accept gifts from
political activists? To assign clerks or court staff to work on their
memoirs or other books? Some of these events have occurred and others
have not (although they are all imaginable).23 When questioned,
individual Justices have from time to time stated personal opinions on
the virtuousness of their own activities—unsurprisingly, no Justice has
ever admitted doing anything wrong—but there is no definitive
statement from the Court itself regarding self-imposed limits of
propriety.24
23
See Alfini, supra note 12, at 11–13 (noting that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia have
appeared as speakers at partisan events, while Justice Alito and Justice Thomas have
attended fundraising events for partisan groups and accepted gifts from various
organizations). Justice Thomas accepted a bust of Abraham Lincoln valued at $15,000 from
the American Enterprise Institute. Id. at 12. Justice Thomas has also acknowledged the
assistance of a Supreme Court librarian in writing his memoir. See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY
GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR xii–xiii (2007) (“Patricia Evans at the Supreme Court
Library worked tirelessly to track down even the most obscure facts and documents based
on my faintest recollections.”). Justice Stevens has likewise acknowledged memoir writing
assistance from court staff and his clerks. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME
COURT MEMOIR 281–82 (2011) (recognizing the help from his clerk and staff in the
acknowledgment section of his memoir). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, told a reporter,
“I could not use my law clerks” for research on his books. Jess Bravin, Writers Bloc: Justice
Scalia’s Literary Collaborator Tells All, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 23, 2012, 2:26 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/07/23/writers-bloc-justice-scalia%e2%80%99s-literarycollaborator-tells-all/.
24
The only partial exception is the Court’s 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy, which
applies only to cases where a Justice’s relative works for a law firm involved in the
litigation. Seven Justices jointly issued the statement as a press release rather than a rule,
and it has never been generally available. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court,
Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 1101–03 (2d ed. 2007)
(setting out what the recusal policy will be when relatives or partners of those relatives
appear before them). The statement was signed by only seven of the then-sitting justices,
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Recall Chief Justice Roberts’s observation that the Code of Conduct for
U.S. Judges, as adopted by the Judicial Conference, “does not adequately
answer some of the ethical considerations unique to the Supreme
Court.”25 Maybe so, although the Chief identified only one such
concern—recusal, which is in any event governed by a separate federal
statute—that will be addressed in the next section. 26 Regarding all other
matters, it is difficult to envision situations in which Supreme Court
Justices ought to follow different ethical standards than those of lower
court judges. Granting Roberts’s premise, however, it would be an
entirely simple matter for the Supreme Court to adapt the Code of Judicial
Conduct to its own circumstances. Most state supreme courts have made
their own revisions—some modest, some extensive—to the Model Code,
and the U.S. Supreme Court could easily take the same approach. Is the
Judicial Conference Code too restrictive regarding political activity? Is it
too permissive when it comes to the use of court staff? Well, fix it. Of
course, that would require a public declaration of the Court’s own
standards on matters, such as confidentiality and political activity, in
which case the Justices could then be held accountable for
noncompliance—the latter being something they appear to regard with
near horror.
Ultimately, it would matter very little what the Supreme Court’s
code of judicial conduct might say about the confidentiality of
deliberations, or anything else, so long as it says something definitive. It
is fine and good for the Justices to look to numerous outside sources for
with Justices Blackmun and Souter abstaining. Id. at 1101. It is unknown whether
Blackmun and Souter thought the Court’s approach to recusal was too sweeping or too
narrow (or unnecessary in Souter’s case, as he was unmarried and childless). Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito have since adopted the 1993 statement. Ross E. Davies, The
Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79,
91–92 (2006). The positions of Justices Kagan and Sotomayor are not currently known
(although both are unmarried and childless, so the question of close relatives at law firms
may be moot). Davies further provides insight on several of the Court’s unannounced
recusal policies. See generally id. (exploring several situations where Justices have recused
themselves). There has been only one instance of an open dispute between Justices
regarding an ethics issue, in which Justice Jackson implicitly criticized Justice Black for
failing to recuse himself in a case involving his former law partner. See Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 897, 897–98 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing the lack of uniform practice of Justices recusing themselves); see
also Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 203 (1988) (“Only
once in the history of the Supreme Court of the United States has one of its members
publicly accused another of unethical behavior and of manipulating the decision-making
process for personal ends . . . .”).
25
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 5.
26
See id. at 7 (setting out Chief Justice Roberts’s views regarding the recusal of Supreme
Court Justices, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the
written policies that govern recusal of Supreme Court Justices).
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“guidance,” as Chief Justice Roberts put it, but a well-articulated code of
conduct would actually let the public know what to expect.27
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RECUSAL PRACTICE
Though important, the ethics of confidentiality and political
cheerleading are collateral to judicial decision-making. Recusal practice,
in contrast, goes to the heart of judging. Throughout the course of the
PPACA litigation, questions were raised about the participation of
Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. It was suggested that
Thomas was disqualified by virtue of his wife’s high-profile opposition
to the PPACA, and that Kagan’s recusal was necessary because of her
previous position as Solicitor General in the Obama administration.28
There is no need here to review or evaluate the pro-recusal arguments,
some of which were more substantial than others. Suffice it to say that
both Kagan and Thomas participated fully in NFIB v. Sebelius.29 It is fair
to assume that both Justices at least briefly considered recusal—given all
of the controversy that surrounded them, not to mention the fact that
Chief Justice Roberts implicitly addressed the issue in his annual
message—but neither Thomas nor Kagan ever publicly explained their
individual decisions to remain in the case.30
A. The Code of Silence
Kagan’s situation is in some ways the more interesting because she
did recuse herself in the contentious Arizona immigration case, Arizona
v. United States, which was decided just a week before NFIB v. Sebelius.31
Both the immigration and health care cases were pending during
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 5.
See Joan Biskupic, Calls for Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case, USA TODAY, Nov. 20,
2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-20/supreme-courtobamacare-health/51324806/1 (explaining why some urged that Justices Thomas and
Kagan sit out of the Obamacare decision).
29
See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576, 2609, 2642 (2012) (indicating where either
Kagan and Thomas join an opinion on the case).
30
Freedom Watch, a public interest organization, filed an amicus brief in NFIB seeking
the disqualification of Justice Kagan, as well as a motion requesting to present oral
argument on the issue. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch in Support of Neither
Party and on Issue of Recusal or Disqualification of Justice Elena Kagan, NFIB v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400), 2012 WL 72452. The Court denied the motion to
participate in oral argument without comment, except to state that “Justice KAGAN took
no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.” NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 1161,
1161 (2012). The Court similarly denied Freedom Watch’s motion to reconsider, again
noting that Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct.
1652, 1652 (2012).
31
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012).
27
28
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Kagan’s tenure as Solicitor General, so it is obvious that she
distinguished between the two matters for the purpose of recusal. It
appears that she anticipated the challenges to the PPACA and therefore
screened herself from any involvement in the litigation while she was
Solicitor General, but Kagan herself has never made that explicit, and the
precise details of her analysis remain unknown.32
Justice Kagan’s silence follows the practice of the other Justices, who
almost never explain the reasons for their recusal or non-recusal
decisions.33 In some cases, of course, a Justice’s motivation for recusal is
obvious or can easily be inferred. Justice Breyer, for example, always
disqualified himself in cases involving his brother, who was, until
recently, a U.S. district court judge in San Francisco.34 In many
situations, however, the rationale is opaque, as was the case when Justice
Kennedy belatedly disqualified himself in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C.
v. Amalgamated Bank.35 Knowledgeable observers have speculated that
the recusal had something to do with the financial interests of Kennedy’s
son, who is a mortgage banker, but the Justice himself declined requests
for an explanation.36
The Justices’ near total reticence to clarify recusal decisions is almost
impossible to understand. Surely there are Court insiders—including
former clerks—who are privy to an individual Justice’s reasoning, but
why withhold the same information from other lawyers and the public?
32
See Biskupic, supra note 28 (explaining that Kagan has stated that she had no
involvement defending the PPACA); Michael B. Mukasey, The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020401200
4577070162911944188.html (“There has been no evidence that [Justice Kagan] acted
personally in her official capacity as solicitor general in connection with any issue in the
[PPACA].”); James Oliphant, Kagan, Thomas Pressed to Stay out of Healthcare Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/01/news/la-pn-kagan-thomas20111201 (noting that in her confirmation hearing, Justice Kagan testified that she played a
minimal role in the Justice Department’s efforts to develop a litigation strategy to defend
the PPACA).
33
The two remarkable exceptions include the lengthy opinions of the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, and Justice Scalia in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court D.C. See Cheney
v. U.S. Dist. Court D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 929 (2004) (denying a motion that Justice Scalia recuse
himself because of his relationship with the Vice President); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
824 (1972) (“While neither the Court nor any Justice individually appears ever to have done
so, I [(Justice Rehnquist)] have determined that it would be appropriate for me to state the
reasons which have led to my decision with respect to respondents’ motion [for recusal].”).
34
See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 644–45 (2004) (noting Justice Breyer’s
recusal on the case tried in the Northern District of California by his brother, Charles R.
Breyer).
35
132 S.Ct. 2065, 2068 (2012).
36
See Tony Mauro, Family Matters, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2012, at 11, 14. (stating that Justice
Kennedy declined to publicly explain the reason for his recusal in RadLAX Gateway Hotel v.
Amalgamated Bank).
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And why not establish a body of case law on recusal that would provide
guidance for both Justices and lower court judges in the future? The
Supreme Court has never offered an explanation for this practice,
although several Justices have discussed it off the record with the
journalist Tony Mauro, telling him “that they don’t explain their reasons
because they would not want to pressure their colleagues into recusing
in a similar situation.”37 Then Associate Justice William Rehnquist
expressed a similar rationale in 1981 in response to an inquiry from the
Des Moines Register. “Some of my colleagues would agree” with his
recusal decisions, said Rehnquist, but “some would not,” and it was
therefore preferable to keep mum about his reasons.38 In other words,
the Justices appear to value flexibility—even at the cost of inconsistency
and unpredictability—in an area that is supposed to be governed by
objective ethical standards.
Or, as Mauro astutely put it in a
SCOTUSblog symposium, “[t]hat seems to take collegiality too far. And
it highlights the problematic fact that Justices stay in or bow out of cases
by their own lights, their standards, without review by anyone else.”39
Whatever reasoning was engaged by Justices Kagan and Thomas in
Sebelius, we know one thing for certain: each Justice made his or her own
decision to sit (or to recuse, as did Kagan in Arizona) without
consideration by the full Court. Under the Supreme Court’s established
procedures, all recusal questions are decided solely by the affected
Justice. As Justice Breyer explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
“I have to make up my own mind. Others cannot make it up for me.” 40
Thus, each Justice is accorded what amounts to absolute and
unreviewable discretion to sit in any case, no matter whether there are
objecting litigants or widely perceived conflicts of interest. To the

37
Tony Mauro, Justices in the Media, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:11 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/community/justices-in-the-media/. Justice Frankfurter once
suggested to his colleagues “that it is desirable to state why one takes himself out of a
case,” but to no avail. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952).
38
Letter from Justice William Rehnquist to The Des Moines Register (Dec. 15, 1981), in The
Justices Answer, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 15, 1991, at 12A. Rehnquist did, of course, explain
his most famous nonrecusal decision in Laird v. Tatum, notwithstanding the potential
disagreement of his colleagues. 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
39
Mauro, supra note 37. The Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011
would require a Justice to “disclose in the public record of the proceeding the reasons for
[any] disqualification” as well as for the denial of any recusal motion. Supreme Court
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2011).
40
Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 28 (2011) (statement of Hon. Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States).
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Justices, recusal appears to be regarded as a matter of personal
conscience rather than a question of law.41
B. Solo Decision-Making
The Supreme Court’s recusal policy is mostly unwritten; there is no
published rule that governs the recusal process, even in the face of a
party’s disqualification motion. There is no doubt about the Court’s
procedure, however, as was made clear in the famous Scalia-Cheney
duck hunting case. In response to a motion to disqualify Justice Scalia,
filed by the Sierra Club, the Court entered an order providing that “[i]n
accordance with its historic practice, the Court refers the motion to
recuse in this case to Justice SCALIA.”42 Needless to say, the longevity
of the policy does not make it right, much less uncontroversial. There
has been considerable criticism of the each-justice-decides-alone
procedure, coming from both scholarly and political quarters. The
proposed Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011
includes a fairly radical provision in which retired Justices and senior
circuit court judges could be called upon to participate in the review of
an individual Justice’s denial of a recusal motion.43 More moderate
proposals call for the full Supreme Court itself to rule en banc on the
disqualification of a member Justice.44 Chief Justice Roberts has made it
clear that the Supreme Court is not ready for reform.45 In his 2011
41
As Chief Justice Roberts recognizes, 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides an “objective standard
[that] focuses the recusal inquiry on the perspective of a reasonable person who is
knowledgeable about the legal process and familiar with the relevant facts.” ROBERTS,
supra note 15, at 7.
42
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court D.C., 540 U.S. 1217, 1217 (2004).
43
H.R. 862 § 3(b).
44
Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a
Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 794 (2011) (“Where the
challenge targets a United States Supreme Court Justice . . . the disqualification decision
should be made by the entire court.”) (footnote omitted); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist,
Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 644 (1987) (proposing judicial reforms in which
“[a]ny party aggrieved by the refusal of a Supreme Court Justice to disqualify himself may,
on timely motion, obtain review by the full Supreme Court”); Editorial, A Way Forward on
Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/opinion/
a-way-forward-on-judicial-ethics.html (explaining a proposal to amend the Supreme Court
Justice recusal process that would potentially result in the all of the Justices ruling on the
recusal); Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill’s The Chief Strikes Out, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan.
4, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/01/sherrilynifills-the-chief-strikes-out.html (questioning the Supreme Court’s current recusal process).
45
See ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 3 (addressing the public concerns for a Supreme Court
judicial code of ethics by providing clarification on how the Justices approach ethical issues
and by dispelling some common misconceptions).
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Annual Report, he acknowledged that recusal issues had “recently drawn
public attention,” while defending the Court’s practice of unilateral and
mostly secret decision-making.46 The Chief offered three reasons for his
position: (1) courts do not normally review the recusal decisions of their
own members; (2) review by the full Court could lead to manipulation or
strategic conduct; and (3) recusals must be minimized due to the “unique
circumstances of the Supreme Court.”47
In the first instance, Roberts is simply wrong. In fact, some other
courts do review the recusal decisions of their own members. For
example, the Supreme Court of Alaska follows a procedure in which all
members of the court review denials of disqualification made by any
justice.48 Michigan has a similar process in which all members of the
Michigan Supreme Court review recusal decisions made by their
colleagues upon a party’s motion.49 In many lower state courts, the
denial of a recusal motion may be reviewed by the chief judge. This is
the case in Michigan,50 California,51 Oklahoma,52 Texas,53 and elsewhere.
In the lower federal courts, it is true that recusal motions are
presented in the first instance to the challenged judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 455, but in some cases the motions are nonetheless referred to
other judges. As the First Circuit explained, “[A] trial judge faced with a
section 455(a) recusal motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion to
Id.
Id. at 7–9.
48
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 22.20.020(c) (West 2012) (“If a judicial officer denies
disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for
the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the
other members of the supreme court.”).
49
See MCR 2.003(D)(3)(b) (West 2012) (explaining that when a justice’s participation in a
case is challenged by motion and that justice still denies the motion, a party may move for
the motion to be decided by the entire court).
50
See MCR 2.003(D)(3)(a) (providing that a party may request that the motion be
referred to the chief justice in a court of two or more judges, or they may request that the
motion be referred to another judge by the state court administrator when there is only one
judge or the chief justice is the one in question).
51
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(5) (West 2012) (“[If a judge refuses to recuse
herself, then] the question of disqualification shall be heard and determined by another
judge agreed upon by all the parties who have appeared or, in the event they are unable to
agree within five days of notification of the judge’s answer, by a judge selected by the
chairperson of the Judicial Council, or if the chairperson is unable to act, the vice
chairperson.”).
52
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 2, App., Rule 15(b) (West 2012). In Oklahoma, the
presiding judge of the administrative district hears challenges to the chief judge’s refusal to
disqualify himself. Id. Additionally, civil cases are appealed to the Supreme Court and
criminal cases to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.
53
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)–(g) (West 2012) (stating that the regional presiding judge may
refer the recusal motion to the Chief Justice for consideration).
46
47
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a different judge.”54 The District of Columbia Circuit is in accord—a trial
court “may, of course, at its option transfer the matter to another judge
for decision”—and the local rules for the Northern District of California
specifically recognize the same option.55
In most instances, of course, lower court judges do not need to refer
recusal motions because their own decisions are subject to appeal or
mandamus, or eventually even certiorari, and errors can therefore be
corrected by higher courts.56 Chief Justice Roberts recognized this
distinction, but he drew an odd conclusion. “Like lower court judges,”
said Roberts, “the individual Justices decide for themselves whether
recusal is warranted,” but the issue then goes no further because “[t]here
is no higher court to review a Justice’s decision not to recuse in a
particular case.”57 Once again, the reasoning is circular. Lower court
judges can initially decide recusal for themselves because their decisions
are subject to review, but Supreme Court Justices cannot be reviewed
and must therefore make recusal decisions alone. Thus, there are
precisely nine Judges in the United States who exercise idiosyncratic
discretion over their own recusal, because, well, because they like it that
way.58
There is an obvious further problem with the Chief’s position. He
says that there is “no higher court” to review an individual Justice’s
decision, but of course there is the full Supreme Court itself.59 The
Constitution vests the judicial power in “one supreme Court,” not in
nine individual Justices, and it is therefore evident that judicial decisions
are to be made by a majority of the Court.60 The solo recusal practice is
In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).
United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also N.D. CAL. CIV. LOC.
R. 3-15 (explaining that a judge may refer “matters arising under 28 U.S.C. § 455 to the
Clerk so that another Judge can determine disqualification”).
56
See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (finding that a
West Virginia Supreme Court Justice’s failure to recuse himself was a violation of due
process); United States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court
judge’s denial of defendant’s recusal motion); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1317 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus based on a
claim that the district court judge improperly ruled against recusal); White v. SunTrust
Bank, 538 S.E.2d 889, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing the state court’s order denying a
motion to recuse).
57
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 8.
58
Chief Justice Roberts also ignores the great likelihood that lower court practice is
influenced by the Supreme Court’s policy. If the Supreme Court Justices were to begin
referring recusal motions to colleagues, many lower courts would no doubt follow suit. It
makes no sense to suggest that the Supreme Court’s practice is derived from lower courts’
non-referral policies.
59
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 8.
60
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54
55
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therefore a policy choice made by the Justices and not a consequence of
the Constitution’s structure.
According to Chief Justice Roberts, however, review by the full
Court “would create an undesirable situation in which the Court could
affect the outcome of a case by selecting who among its Members may
participate.”61 This argument fails for two reasons. First, a majority of
the Court would never need to “affect the outcome of a case” by
disqualifying a colleague, because a majority could always, by definition,
control the outcome with or without the participation of the recused
Justice. Thus, the scenario that troubles the Chief could never occur in
reality.
Roberts’s fear of outcome manipulation is untenable for a second,
and more important, reason as well. The current disqualification
practice depends on the assumption that each individual Justice will
decide recusals fairly and dispassionately. Indeed, Roberts assures us
that the Justices are all “jurists of exceptional integrity” and that he has
“complete confidence in the capability of [his]colleagues to determine
when recusal is warranted.”62 That being the case, why does he worry
that five or more Justices—individually towers of rectitude—would
suddenly become calculated schemers when acting in concert? By
simple force of mathematics, it is more probable that a single Justice
would act strategically to remain in a case, rather than that five Justices
would connive to exclude a sixth.63
But strategic behavior really has nothing to do with it. Nobody
suggests that Supreme Court Justices intentionally participate in cases
when they know they should disqualify themselves (much less that a
majority would intentionally boot a colleague whom they know to be
disinterested and impartial). The real issue is that all individuals—
including Justices—are extremely poor arbiters of their own objectivity.
This should not come as a surprise to the Supreme Court. Justice
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 9.
Id. at 10.
63
See, e.g., Davies, supra note 24, at 88 (discussing the only known case of collectively
imposed recusal, in which the Justices actually prevented a colleague’s disqualification
from affecting the outcome of any case). On New Year’s Eve, 1974, Justice William O.
Douglas suffered a severely debilitating stroke but he refused to resign from the bench. Id.
After observing Douglas’s increasingly uneven behavior both on and off the bench, seven
of the other eight Justices made a secret arrangement to deprive Douglas of meaningful
voting rights on the Court. Id. They agreed that no written opinions would be assigned to
Douglas and that “they would not hand down any judgment arrived at by a 5-4 vote where
Mr. Justice Douglas is in the majority.” Id. (quoting Letter from Justice White to Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
(Oct. 20, 1975), reprinted in DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER
WHITE app. 2, at 463 (1998)).
61
62
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Frankfurter made just that observation when recusing himself from a
case in 1952, recognizing that “reason cannot control the subconscious
influence of feelings of which it is unaware.”64 There is an enormous
literature in psychology that supports this rather obvious conclusion. In
fact, it is beyond scientific dispute that we are all profoundly unaware of
our own perceptual biases and cognition errors.65 The poetic case is
equally strong.66
As the Supreme Court noted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., one
can never know whether a judge has “simply misread[] or
misapprehend[ed] the real motives at work in deciding the case,”
especially when the sole decision-maker is “the one accused of bias.”67
There is an inevitable chance of error when judges are called upon to
determine their own neutrality, and it is multiplied when the decision is
placed beyond review. Justice Kagan, for example, set up a screen to
isolate herself from the health care litigation when she was at the Justice
Department, and then, as a Supreme Court Justice, she was the sole
evaluator of the screen’s sufficiency. Quite literally, she sat in final
judgment of her own earlier actions. Without questioning the rigor of
Kagan’s precautions, or her sincerity in believing them adequate, it is
still certain that other Justices could have brought greater objectivity to
the decision. In Caperton, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
may sometimes require the disqualification of a judge or justice, even in
the absence of actual bias. It is a due process truism that “no man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause,” and there is no exception under

Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952).
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 239–40 (2011) (“[T]he confidence
that people have in their intuitions is not a reliable guide to their validity. In other words,
do not trust anyone—including yourself—to tell you how much you should trust their
judgment.”). “We are often confident even when we are wrong, and an objective observer
is more likely to detect our errors than we are.” Id. at 4. The neuroscientist Tali Sharot uses
Justice Scalia’s refusal to recuse himself in Cheney to demonstrate “introspection illusion.”
TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN 16–18
(2012). “An introspection illusion is the strong sense that people have that they can directly
access the processes underlying their mental states. Most mental processes, however, are
largely unavailable for conscious interpretation. The catch is that people are unaware of
their unawareness.” Id. at 18. Professor Sharot contends that although “Scalia thought he
had insight into his inner motives, and mental state . . . [h]e was, at least partially,
mistaken.” Id. at 17.
66
See ROBERT BURNS, To a Louse, in THE POEMS AND SONGS OF ROBERT BURNS 141, 142
(Ernest Rhys ed., Everyman’s Library 1906) (1785) (“O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us/To
see oursels as ithers see us!/It wad frae monie a blunder free us.”).
67
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883, 885 (2009).
64
65
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the venerable axiom for Supreme Court Justices ruling on their own
recusals.68
As Judge Richard Posner has observed, Supreme Court Justices face
a special “risk of acquiring an exaggerated opinion of their ability and
character” due to the very nature of the job.69 There is no need to pose
the specter of intentional misconduct—by one or any number of
Justices—in order to recognize that collective decision-making is
preferable when it comes to identifying subconscious biases or latent and
unacknowledged partiality.
C. The Duty to Sit
Chief Justice Roberts’s third point is a non-sequitur, but an
important one. Noting that Supreme Court recusal involves “an
important factor that is not present in the lower courts,” Roberts cautions
that disqualification must be invoked sparingly so that the Court does
not “sit without its full membership.”70 But why raise this issue at all in
the context of procedural questions? The posited problem of overrecusal should have no bearing on the locus of the decision—unless, of
course, the full Court would be disposed to disqualify Justices who
would otherwise choose to sit. And that scenario—which is implicit in
Roberts’s rationale—actually establishes the likelihood that individual
Justices do indeed err on recusal matters. If individual Justices always
got it right, after all, there would never be additional recusals following
full Court review.
Nonetheless, the Chief stresses the “duty to sit,” which has been
emphasized by Supreme Court Justices from William Rehnquist to

68
Id. at 870. In an unguarded moment, Justice Scalia once commented, “I do not trust
myself to be a good—what should I say? A good interpreter of what modern American
values are.” Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary., 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Hon. Antonin Scalia,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States). He was speaking about the concept of
cruel and unusual punishment, but the sentiment applies equally well to judicial
disqualification. Id. In his Cheney opinion, however, Justice Scalia confidently opined that
no reasonable observer would question his impartiality, notwithstanding his recent duck
hunting excursion with the Vice President. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court D.C, 541 U.S. 913,
926 (2004). That observation would have been far more compelling if it had come from
someone other than Scalia himself. As the Seventh Circuit’s Judge Hamilton recently
noted, “The danger, of course, is that this ‘reasonable, objective observer,’ as in most fields
of law, tends to sound a lot like the judge authoring the opinion.” Doe v. Elmbrook Sch.
Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
69
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 306 (2008).
70
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 9.
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Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.71 Congress believed it had abolished
the duty to sit by amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1974,72 but it evidently
remains operative in the chambers of the Supreme Court, prompted by
the fear of 4-4 outcomes. As Justice Breyer explained in recent Senate
testimony, “[I]f I take myself out of the case in the Supreme Court, that
could change the result because there is no one else to put in.”73 Justice
Scalia has put it even more forcefully, insisting that “[e]ven one
unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the [Supreme] Court” by
creating the possibility of a 4-4 split.74 While ties are naturally
frustrating in every milieu, the Justices’ fear of such outcomes is
tremendously overblown. Although a number of cases are heard each
term by only eight Justices, the dreaded 4-4 splits are exceedingly rare.
According to a study by two political scientists, there were only eleven
such stalemates during the period 1986–2003; fewer than one per year.75
During the entire post-war era, 1946–2003, 599 cases were decided by
eight-member Courts, but only 49 resulted in 4-4 deadlocks.76
But would more frequent recusals—as apparently feared by Chief
Justice Roberts in the event of reformed procedures—result in a
significantly greater number of unresolved cases? The answer, it can be
demonstrated, is almost certainly not. As a starting point, it is obvious
that a recusal can only change the outcome of a case that would
otherwise be decided by a 5-4 vote. Any other voting pattern would be
unaffected by the absence of a single Justice. Moreover, even the 5-4
71
See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916 (referencing Justice Scalia’s analysis of the duty to sit);
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (providing Justice Rehnquist’s emphasis on the
“duty to sit”); Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4–6 (2011) (statement of Hon.
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States) (providing the
statement of Justice Breyer on the duty to sit).
72
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974) (stating that the language of the current statute
removes the “so called ‘duty to sit’”); see 119 CONG. REC. 6102, 6113 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1973)
(statement of Sen. Burdick); see also M. Margaret McKeown, To Judge or Not to Judge:
Transparency and Recusal in the Federal System, 30 REV. LITIG. 653, 662 (2011) (“The 1974
amendment to § 455 abolished the duty to sit doctrine and its corresponding presumption
against recusal, and harmonized the statutory and ethical recusal standards.”) (footnote
omitted).
73
Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27–28 (2011) (statement of Hon. Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States). To state the obvious, recusal can only
change a result if it leads to a 4-4 affirmance by an equally divided Court. All other
possible voting patterns are unaffected by the absence of a single Justice.
74
Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916 (quoting Press Release, Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal
Policy 1 (Nov. 1, 1993), http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20110106_RecusalPolicy23.pdf).
75
Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme
Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 90–92 (2005)
76
Id. at 89–90 (illustrating the rarity of the 4-4 split).
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cases would be unaffected by the disqualification of a Justice in the
minority—the result would be the same whether the vote was 5-4 or 5-3.
And even the disqualification of a Justice in the majority would only
change the outcome in cases that would otherwise be reversed, because a
4-4 vote results in affirmance by an equally divided Court.
With those principles in mind, we can now do some calculations to
determine the likely maximum number of 4-4 decisions that could be
generated by recusal reform.
To begin, let us assume, quite
unrealistically, that one Justice would then be disqualified in every single
case before the Court (realistically, the number would be smaller by at
least one order of magnitude). Historically, only about 20–25% of
Supreme Court cases each term have been decided by 5-4 votes, so that
sets a rough upper limit on the number of decisions that could be
changed by a recusal, even if one Justice were to be randomly
disqualified in every case of the term. 77 And even in those cases, of
course, 45% of the Justices (four out of nine, and rounding slightly)
would have voted in the minority, meaning that only 55% of recusals
would matter to the outcome of a case. This further reduces the universe
of hypothetically changed decisions to no more than 14% (.55 x .25 =
.1375). But that still overstates the potential for changed outcomes,
because about 30% of all cases are affirmed, meaning that a 4-4
affirmance would change nothing.78 That leaves at most 10% (.7 x .14 =
.098) of all cases in the outcome-changing 4-4 category, even if every single
case were to be decided by an eight member Court.
Needless to say, no conceivable procedural policy would ever lead to
such rampant disqualification. It would be far more reasonable,
although still expansive, to suppose that any procedural change would
result, at most, in nine additional recusals per term—that is, one for each
Justice—which will allow us to make some fairly realistic projections
based on recent experience. Because she had served as solicitor general,
Justice Elena Kagan disqualified herself an unusually large number of
77
See Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Divided Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2005, at A37, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2005/10/06governancesunstein; see also StatPack for October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2012),
http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf
(stating that on average from October 2006 to October 2010, 24% of the Court’s decisions
were 5–4 splits, and 20% of the Court’s decisions in 2011 were 5–4 splits).
78
Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals,
LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 8–12, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheckdam.pdf. SCOTUSblog
has tallied the number of affirmed cases since 1995, and, based on those numbers, the
Court affirms an average of 28.6% of its cases each term. See Stat Pack for October Term 2010,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf.
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times during her first term on the Court. Although Kagan stepped aside
in twenty-eight of the fully briefed cases on the Court’s docket, only two
of her recusals resulted in 4–4 affirmances.79 Assuming that this ratio
would more or less hold for all Justices and using the assumption of one
more recusal per Justice per year, we could therefore expect to see only
two additional 4–4 decisions every three years (nine Justices x three
years = twenty-seven recusals; virtually the same as Justice Kagan’s
twenty-eight, which led to only two stalemates). In short, there is
nothing to fear.
IV. THE CHALLENGE
The Chief Justice’s arguments may be weak, but his institutional
position is powerful. In his 2011 Report, he rather pointedly remarked
that “[t]he limits of Congress’s power to require recusal have never been
tested.”80 Although he did not elaborate, Roberts was surely suggesting
that recusal is an aspect of “judicial power” under the Constitution and
therefore the exclusive province of the judiciary.81 Perhaps that is so. At
least one formidable scholar has argued forcefully that 28 U.S.C. § 455 is
unconstitutional when applied to the Supreme Court.82 On the other
hand, several Justices have implicitly conceded the validity of statutory
recusal standards, including Justice Scalia (in his duck hunting opinion)
and Justice Breyer (in Senate testimony).83
Unfortunately, no Justice appears ever to have recognized the
inherently subjective nature of the underlying value judgment involved
in recusal. In simple terms, judicial disqualification policy requires a
choice. Which is better for the citizenry, a full Court with a possibly
compromised member, or an eight-member Court that may produce a 44 result? The current Supreme Court practice clearly favors the first
approach—as articulated by Chief Justice Roberts and others—but that is
really just a matter of the Justices’ own preference. It could be seen as at
Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81,
94 (2011); Stat Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 77, at 3.
80
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 7.
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See id. (stating that Justices have unique circumstances of recusal due to their position
on the Supreme Court).
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See generally Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal
Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181 (2011).
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See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004) (providing the opinion of
Justice Scalia not to recuse himself with regard to the duck hunting case involving VicePresident Dick Cheney); Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4–6 (2011) (statement of
Hon. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States).
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least equally reasonable to prefer a non-decision to the possibility of a
biased one, and that sort of choice—that is, allocating the risk of error—is
usually considered an issue for the legislature. Perhaps the public, as
represented by Congress, would not be very much bothered by the
prospect of a few more tie votes on the Supreme Court each year. In fact,
there have been several periods in history when Congress purposely
established an even number of Justices. There were only six Justices on
the original Court created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the seventh
was not added until 1807; there were ten authorized seats on the Court
from 1863–66, and then briefly eight for over a year until the current nine
member Court was established in 1869.84 It is therefore evident that the
need for a tie-breaker is a matter of legislative policy, and thus it does
not fall under the judicial power. The Justices no doubt find it easier to
sit with an odd-numbered bench, but that does not mean they are
entitled to one.
Chief Justice Roberts’s devotion to judge-made recusal rules is
somewhat at odds with his opening statement at his confirmation
hearing, when he told the senators that “[j]udges are like umpires.
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”85 Despite his
commitment to humility, Roberts’s 2011 Report clearly cautioned
Congress that the Supreme Court would not necessarily comply with
legislation concerning judicial conduct and recusal issues.86 It is
interesting to contemplate a possible confrontation between Congress
and the Supreme Court over the imposition of ethics requirements. The
Justices obviously would have the last word about the extent of their
own authority. It is the Court, after all, that interprets the Constitution.
Then again, Congress has certain coercive powers of its own. For
example, a long-sought judicial pay raise could be tied to the Court’s
adoption of a code of conduct. But it will never come to that. As he has
demonstrated many times, Chief Justice Roberts cares deeply about the
Court’s reputation and legitimacy, and it is all but inconceivable that any
Chief Justice would simply ignore ethics legislation, whether it had been
“tested” or not. As Roberts noted, concerning statutory financial
reporting requirements and limitations on gifts, “The Court has never
addressed whether Congress may impose those requirements on the
RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
4, 9–11, 16 (3d ed. 2005), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/creat3ed.pdf/$File/
creat3ed.pdf.
85
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
86
See generally ROBERTS, supra note 15 (noting the varying source of precedent that
governs judicial conduct and recusal).
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The Justices nevertheless comply with those
V. CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Roberts often reminds us that he is a great baseball fan,
and he enjoys using the national pastime to illustrate legal concepts. For
example, he began his 2011 Annual Report with the story of the 1919
Chicago White Sox, whose conspiracy to fix the World Series led to the
appointment of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the first
commissioner of baseball and, indirectly, to the promulgation of the first
Canons of Judicial Ethics.88 More famously, at his confirmation hearing,
Roberts compared himself to an umpire whose job it is simply to call
balls and strikes and, he might have added, whose decisions are final.89
The Rules of Major League Baseball are markedly similar in some
respects to the recusal practice of the Supreme Court. For example, Rule
9.02(b) provides that “[i]f there is reasonable doubt that any umpire’s
decision may be in conflict with the rules, the [team] manager may
appeal the decision and ask that a correct ruling be made. Such appeal
shall be made only to the umpire who made the protested decision.”90
Moreover, Rule 9.02(c) specifies that “[n]o umpire shall criticize, seek to
reverse or interfere with another umpire’s decision unless asked to do so
by the umpire making it.”91 Thus, major league umpires exercise the
same sort of unreviewable discretion as do Supreme Court Justices. As
Chief Justice Roberts put it in his Report, each umpire is “the court of last
resort” for his own decisions.92
But not quite. In baseball, there is an exceptional circumstance in
which an umpire is required to defer to a colleague. Because of the
positioning of the batter and catcher, it is extremely difficult for a home
plate umpire to determine when a player has checked his swing, which
can make the difference between a ball and a strike. Consequently, the
home plate umpire may ask for assistance from either the first or third
base umpire (depending on whether the batter is right or left handed).
Id. at 6
Id. at 1. Landis was a graduate of the Northwestern University School of Law. That
trivium is irrelevant to this article, but it is irresistible.
89
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 31 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
90
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2012 EDITION: OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 9.02(b), at 80
(2012), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2012/Official_Baseball_Rules.
pdf.
91
Id. 9.02(c), at 80.
92
ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 9.
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And unlike all other situations, “the home plate umpire must refer to a
base umpire for his judgment on the half swing” when a manager or catcher
objects to the initial call.93 The reason for this exception is compelling.
The home plate umpire simply lacks the right perspective to make the
call, and so the objecting team is entitled to the decision of another
umpire who can view the play from an uncompromised angle.
As with umpires and half swings, so it ought to be with Justices and
disqualification. No individual can have a clear perspective on his or her
own impartiality, and decisions would therefore be better made by
objective colleagues. It is time for a new recusal procedure in the
Supreme Court, and a comprehensive code of conduct would be a pretty
good idea too.

93
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 90, 9.02(c) cmt., at 80 (emphasis added). The
mandatory appeal applies only “when the plate umpire calls the pitch a ball, but not when
the pitch is called a strike.” Id. In that sense, it is the equivalent of asking the full Supreme
Court to rule only when an initial recusal motion has been denied by the subject Justice, but
not when it has been allowed.
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